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ABSTRACT

Exploring the Moderating Effect of Cognitive Autonomy on the
Relationship Between Cognitive Distortions and
Youth’s Externalizing Behaviors

by

Liam Fischback, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2018

Major Professor: Dr. Shawn D. Whiteman
Department: Human Development and Family Studies
Studies have linked cognitive distortions to youth’s externalizing behaviors
during adolescence. In recent years, it has been suggested that higher levels of cognitive
autonomy, which develops during adolescence, may be a protective factor for youth’s
adjustment. To date, studies have failed to integrate how these two cognitive processes
operate and relate to adolescents’ adjustment. The purpose of this study was to determine
if cognitive autonomy moderated the relationship between cognitive distortions and
externalizing behaviors in a clinical population of adolescents. As cognitive distortions
have been found to be greater and more prevalent in clinical populations, it was
hypothesized that cognitive autonomy could be contaminated by cognitive distortions and
could exacerbate the relationship between cognitive distortions and externalizing
behaviors. Data from 146 adolescents, collected as part of an on-going internal
assessment from a residential treatment facility, were included in this study. Hierarchical
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multiple regression analyses were used to examine if links between cognitive distortions,
cognitive autonomy, and externalizing behaviors existed, and to determine if components
of cognitive autonomy moderated the link between cognitive distortions and externalizing
behaviors. Consistent with expectations, analyses revealed significant relationships
between cognitive distortions and externalizing behaviors. Inconsistent with expectations,
aspects of cognitive autonomy were negatively linked to externalizing behaviors.
Specifically, evaluative thinking and decision-making were negatively associated with
externalizing behaviors. Furthermore, neither dimension of cognitive autonomy was
found to moderate the relationship between cognitive distortions and externalizing
behaviors. Discussion highlights potential reasons and alternative explanations for the
results that were inconsistent with expectations. Limitations and future directions also
are discussed.
(87 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Exploring the Moderating Effect of Cognitive Autonomy on the
Relationship Between Cognitive Distortions and
Youth’s Externalizing Behaviors

Liam Fischback, Master of Science

Scholars have connected cognitive distortions to adolescents’ externalizing
behaviors. Other scholars have offered that higher levels of cognitive autonomy, which
develops during adolescence, may be a protective factor for problem behaviors in
adolescence. To date, no studies have explored how these two cognitive processes
function and potentially interact to predict adolescent problem behaviors. This study’s
purpose was to see if cognitive autonomy affected the relationship between cognitive
distortions and externalizing behaviors in a clinical population of adolescents. Past
research has suggested that cognitive distortions are greater and more prevalent in clinical
populations. Because of this, the processes of cognitive autonomy could be affected by
cognitive distortions (that can form prior to adolescence), and worsen the relationship
between cognitive distortions and externalizing behaviors. This study analyzed 146
adolescents, from a residential treatment facility. Hierarchical multiple regression
analyses were used to examine if links between cognitive distortions, cognitive
autonomy, and externalizing behaviors existed, and to determine if elements of cognitive
autonomy affected the relationship between cognitive distortions and externalizing
behaviors. As expected, analyses showed that cognitive distortions and externalizing
behaviors were related. Additionally, results indicated that aspects of cognitive autonomy
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were protective of externalizing behaviors. Results did not reveal that cognitive
autonomy affected the relationship between cognitive distortions and externalizing
behaviors. Discussion highlights potential reasons and alternative explanations for the
results that were inconsistent with expectations. Limitations and future directions also
are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Why do some individuals engage in antisocial behaviors while others do not?
Social-cognitive theory posits that individuals’ behaviors are based upon their
interpretation of social circumstances, and that engaging in problem behaviors are often
the result of inadequacies in interpretation of these events (Nas, Brugman, & Koops,
2008). Cognitive distortions are inaccurate or biased ways of attending to or conferring
meaning upon experiences (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996). Cognitive distortions allow
individuals to neutralize guilt and empathy associated with antisocial behaviors, and
serve as rationalizations to protect self-perception while individuals take part in problem
behaviors (Bandura, 1991; Barriga, Gibbs, Potter, & Liau, 2001; Barriga, Landau,
Stinson II, Liau, & Gibbs, 2000). Self-serving cognitive distortions, specifically, have
been positively associated with individuals engaging in externalizing behaviors (Barriga,
Gibbs, et al., 2001).
Externalizing practices among children and adolescents have been associated with
greater rates, severity, constancy, and range of problem behaviors (Chabrol, Goutaudier,
Melioli, van Leeuwen, & Gibbs, 2014). Researchers have illustrated that individuals
engaging in externalizing behaviors are also at higher risk for other psychopathologies
such as of lack of remorse, egocentrism, impulsiveness, abrasive treatment of others, and
callousness (Chabrol et al., 2014). The correlations between cognitive distortions and
externalizing behaviors have been well documented (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; van
Leeuwen, Rodgers, Gibbs, & Chabrol, 2014), but examining how cognitive development
impacts these associations has been neglected.
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Adolescence is a time when individuals become more independent. During
adolescence individuals learn how to act, feel, and think more autonomously. The
constructs of behavioral and emotional autonomy have been researched quite heavily,
whereas cognitive autonomy has received much less scholarly attention. Due to the
cerebral nature of cognitive autonomy, it may influence the aforementioned association
between cognitive distortions and externalizing behaviors. To date, however, the
moderating effect of cognitive autonomy on the relationship between cognitive
distortions and externalizing behaviors in clinical populations has yet to been examined.
The present study addresses this gap and may be important as it may help researchers and
clinicians to understand the relationships between these underlying cognitive constructs
and externalizing behaviors.
Theoretical Framework
The Development of Moral Action and Thought: A Social Cognitive Perspective
Social cognitive theory posits that individuals learn through direct interaction with
the environment and their observation of others’ interactions with their environments
(i.e., modeling; Bandura, 1989). The learning of social values underlying acceptable
behaviors is a gradual process that starts with basics and develops over time. Due to lack
of experience, little is expected of young children; correspondingly, very few social rules
of conduct are enforced. As children mature cognitively and have more experience
interacting with family members and peers, more appropriate social behaviors are
expected (Bandura, 1991). Adults teach children socially appropriate strategies to
replace inappropriate behaviors. For example, adults teach children to ask for things
instead of cry so that children’s needs are fulfilled. Likewise, adults may also teach
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children to use words instead of hitting. As adults teach children about these social rules
of conduct, children grow and develop their understanding of these rules (Bradley, 2007;
Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998; Morris, Silk, Steinberg, Myers, & Robinson,
2007). In early childhood, children are unlikely to grasp the moral foundations of such
rules; but as children’s social proficiency and experience develops, these moral
underpinnings are more easily comprehended and appreciated. Appropriately, as children
mature, physical penalties for misconduct are replaced with social ones (Bandura, 1991).
Learning social rules of conduct is important as a child; however, the
understanding and adoption of moral standards allows for the construction of personal
morals, which are vital as individuals grow and develop. Personal morals facilitate moral
reasoning as they provide a basis for individuals to self-evaluate behaviors and their
associated consequences. This moral reasoning, or evaluating, develops along with
individuals’ understanding of rules of conduct and the values associated with them
(Bandura, 1991). For example, at first a child may know the rule that is wrong to steal.
An adolescent may know the same rule but also understand that stealing is wrong, not
just because it is illegal or they were told so, but because stealing is a violation of trust;
both may choose to steal or not to, but the underlying cognitive processes will be
different. When faced with a moral dilemma, individuals exercise moral reasoning
through the use of “moral judgment of the rightness or wrongness of conduct evaluated
against personal standards and situational circumstances, and self-sanctions” (Bandura,
2001, p. 8). In short, the behavior that individuals exhibit is result of this deliberative
process.
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Social cognitive theory maintains that individuals want to feel good about
themselves. If this is so then why do people choose to engage in antisocial behaviors,
and how can they justify their actions? Individuals that engage in antisocial behaviors to
justify their actions, before or after the fact, by utilizing “mechanisms of moral
disengagement.” Mechanisms of moral disengagement protect one’s self-image through
rationalizations and/or distortions of events that allows externalizing behaviors to be
detached from self-evaluation. These mechanisms distort how events are perceived,
allowing individuals to engage in antisocial behaviors with little to no remorse (Bandura,
1991). Social cognitive theory takes into account that when making moral decisions
individuals must live with the consequences of their decisions. However, when
mechanisms of moral disengagement are used, individuals may not be accurately viewing
situations or their consequences (Bandura, 2001). These inaccurate assessments will be
discussed later. In the meantime, this thesis will focus on the resultant behavior of the
inaccurate assessments.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Types of Problem Behaviors
Within the field of psychology, the distinction between internalizing and
externalizing behaviors has been well established (Achenbach, 1998; Achenbach &
Edelbrock, 1978). Externalizing behaviors are defined as a group of behaviors that are
targeted toward individuals’ external environments. Behaviors in this cluster violate
central social or moral rules that either directly, or indirectly, harm others and/or
themselves (Barriga, Gibbs, et al., 2001; Nas et al., 2008; ten Cate, 2011). Instead of
healthy responses to stress and negative emotions, individuals exhibiting externalizing
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behaviors direct feelings outwardly toward people and things (Achenbach, 1991a; Liu,
2004). The externalizing construct includes disorders such as: oppositional defiance
disorder (ODD), conduct disorder (CD), attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),
externalizing personality disorder (ASPD), substance use disorders, intermittent
explosive disorder (IED), kleptomania and pyromania (American Psychological
Association, 2013). Externalizing problems in adolescence have been shown to be
strongly associated with adjustment problems in adulthood (e.g., criminal activity,
substance abuse) (Crick, Ostrov, & Werner, 2006; Mathieson & Crick, 2010). While the
term externalizing is often used synonymously with antisocial by many researchers, the
antisocial construct is also reserved by some researchers to reference more severe
behaviors (Liu, 2004). Owing to this distinction and the foci of this thesis, the term
externalizing behaviors will be employed.
Internalizing types of behaviors (e.g., anxiety, inhibition, depression, and
withdrawal) are directed inward and primarily affect the individual’s psyche, producing
a negative self-image (Achenbach, 1991a; Edidin, 2010; Liu, 2004). By their very
nature, internalizing behaviors affect others indirectly, and are not as easily observable as
externalizing behaviors (McConaughy, 1993; Sander, DeBoth, & Ollendick, 2015).
Major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD),
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), acute stress disorder, social phobia, generalized
anxiety disorder, anorexia, and bulimia nervosa are contained within the internalizing
construct. Similar to externalizing behaviors, internalizing problem behaviors in
adolescence are likely to persist into adulthood (Achenbach, Dumenci, & Rescorla, 2002;
Capaldi & Stollmiller, 1999).

6
Externalizing and internalizing behaviors have been shown to be highly comorbid
(Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001a; Capaldi & Stollmiller, 1999; Drabick, Beauchaine,
Gadow, Carlson, & Bromet, 2006; Kim et al., 2003; Liu, 2004). While the distinction
between externalizing and internalizing behaviors is useful, the division between these
two types of behaviors is not perfect. Externalizing problems (e.g., conduct disorder)
may negatively affect the adolescent psyche as well the external domain. Likewise,
adolescent internalizing behaviors (e.g., depression) has the potential to harm family,
friends, and teachers in the external world. Nonetheless, the present research focuses on
youth’s participation and engagement in externalizing behaviors.
Externalizing Behaviors
As externalizing behaviors is a broad umbrella concept, the construct has been
divided into different dimensions. For example, factor analyses have identified two major
types of externalizing behaviors: delinquent behaviors (e.g., lying, stealing, kleptomania,
and other illegal and immortal behaviors) and aggressive behaviors (e.g., fighting,
screaming, ODD, CD, ADHD). Delinquency generally refers to immoral actions or acts
that disregard social norms (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001; Nas et al., 2008). It
is understandable that when many reflect on the term “delinquent,” the phrase and
definition of “juvenile delinquency” is often interwoven (Liu, 2004). The term “juvenile
delinquency” focuses on youth’s engagement in illegal activities, whereas delinquency is
a more comprehensive concept that includes both illegal and legal actions that violate the
underpinnings of social or moral systems. As physical forms of aggression are viewed as
a separate dimension, the term delinquency will be used to reference non-violent
behaviors that disregard social and moral norms (e.g., cheating, stealing, and lying). This
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distinction is important owing to the fact that many delinquent acts are inherently nonaggressive (e.g., lying, stealing, cheating), just as many aggressive acts do not infringe on
social or moral standards (e.g., teasing, eye-rolling). Unlike aggressive forms of
externalizing behaviors, most delinquent acts go undetected except by perpetrators, and
are therefore underreported. Although delinquency and aggression have been shown to
be highly comorbid (Crick et al., 2006; Liu, 2004), this study will focus on aggressive
behaviors.
Aggressive behaviors are complex. In order to differentiate aggressive behaviors,
scholars have further distinguished these behaviors by their form and function. Teasing,
hitting, physical intimidation, and gossiping are all forms of aggressive behaviors that are
different in nature. Hitting another person is a very simple and direct form of aggression;
alternatively, teasing may be done face to face, behind someone’s back, or even online
and is indirect and not as easy to detect (Goldstein, 2016; Lafko, 2015; Moore, Nakano,
Enomoto, & Suda, 2012). Addressing this dissimilarity, empirical researchers have
provided a clearer distinction by bisecting forms of aggression into the categories of
physical and relational aggression (Dodge & Coie, 1987).
Forms of Aggression
Physical aggression. Physical forms of aggression are overt and use physical
injury, or the threat of physical damage (i.e., intimidation), as the method of inflicting
harm on others (Crick et al., 2006; Heilbron & Prinstein, 2008; Murray-Close & Ostrov,
2009; ten Cate, 2011). Physical forms of aggression are easily identifiable and bring to
mind the archetypical “high school bully.” Longitudinal studies investigating the
development of physical aggression have demonstrated that physical aggression changes

8
across the lifespan and differs by gender. Findings from multiple longitudinal studies
reveal heterogeneity in the development of physical aggression from early-childhood to
pre-adolescence (Côté, Vaillancourt, LeBlanc, Nagin, & Tremblay, 2006; Tremblay et
al., 2004).
Focusing on early childhood, Tremblay and colleagues (2004) examined the
development of physical aggression of children from 17 to 42 months of age (n = 546).
They identified two normative developmental trajectories of physical aggression, which
captured about 86% of the population. The first group (about 28%) exhibited little to no
physical aggression, and the second group (about 58%) followed a trajectory of modest
aggression that increased over time. At the last assessment these children were 42
months old (3½ years old), at this age interaction with others and understanding of social
mores may be limited by parents. This lack of interaction and understanding of social
norms could account for this second group’s rising trajectory at this early age and
conforms to social cognitive theory.
Tremblay and colleagues (2004) also identified a third group (about 14%) that
conformed to an abnormal trajectory of high use of physical aggression that increased
over time and noted that boys were more likely to engage in physically aggressive
behaviors than girls. Similar findings have been produced in other longitudinal studies
(Archer & Côté, 2005; Côté et al., 2006) with reference to various developmental stages,
indicating that males engage in physical aggression more frequently than females.
Researchers reported that family dysfunction, poverty, and coercive parenting were
strong predictors of high use of physical aggression in children in this abnormal group,
which adds validity to findings from other studies (Baillargeon et al., 2007; Broidy et al.,
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2003; Côté, 2007; Côté, Vaillancourt, Barker, Nagin, & Tremblay, 2007). Consistent
with the tenets of social cognitive theory, these findings suggest that even at early ages
children may observe and learn aggressive behaviors modeled by parents.
Even though both the normal and abnormal trajectories of physical aggression
increased with age during early childhood, researchers examining the developmental
trajectories of physical aggression from early childhood to pre-adolescence show that use
of physical aggression generally declines as children trans54ition into middle childhood
and early adolescence. For example, Côté and colleagues (2006) examined the
developmental patterns of physical aggression from early childhood to pre-adolescence in
a six-year longitudinal study of Canadian youth. Findings from a representative sample
of ten cohorts of children (each about 1,000 children) between the ages of 2-11, revealed
two normative trajectories. The first of these two groups (31.1%) conformed to a
trajectory consisting of occasional use of physical aggression in early childhood
dwindling to almost no use of physical aggression at 11 years of age. The second group
(52.2%) followed a trajectory of moderate-sporadic use of physical aggression in early
childhood also declining in use as youth aged, exhibiting low and infrequent use of
physical aggression at 11 years of age. Researchers also reported that mean scores for
physical aggression were lower for females than males (Côté et al., 2006). The two
normative groups in this study differed from those found in the study conducted by
Tremblay and associates (2004) in that both groups followed decreasing trajectories of
physical aggression as age increased (about 83%; Côté et al., 2006). Social cognitive
theory suggests that this normative trajectory of decreasing physical aggression is due to
children’s growing social interaction, which leads to greater exposure and grasp of social
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standards concerning physical aggression. Correspondingly, as children’s understanding
of societal norms develops, social standards are gradually enforced, resulting in
diminishing social tolerance of physical aggression as children develop. As youth
become more aware of the social rules and disapproval associated with physical
aggression, use of physical aggression naturally decreases.
Yet, Côté and colleagues (2006) also identified an abnormal trajectory -- a
physical aggression group. About one sixth (16.6%) of the population exhibited high use
of physical aggression in early childhood and maintained high levels of physical
aggression into pre-adolescence. Similar to the abnormal group found by Tremblay and
colleagues (2004), the majority of the children in the abnormal group were from lowincome and/or single parent homes (Côté et al., 2006). Mothers of children following
this abnormal trajectory also reported the consistent use of ineffective and hostile
parenting techniques. Such parenting practices have been be highly correlated with high
levels of aggression in early childhood (Holmes, Yoon, & Berg, 2017), which could be
learned through modeling, experience, observation of hostile parenting techniques of
parents or partners, or lack of modeling of socially appropriate strategies. The abnormal
trajectory group also consisted mostly of boys -- almost double the amount of girls -providing further support to the claim that males are more likely to engage in physical
aggression than females.
Additional research provides evidence of gender differences in the pre-adolescent
model of physical aggression. Broidy and colleagues (2003) investigated the
development of physical aggression from childhood (age 6) to mid-adolescence (age 15)
at six different sites across three countries (Broidy et al., 2003) and found that boys
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exhibited higher levels of physical aggression that girls at all sites. Additionally, they
concluded that boys with high levels of pre-adolescent physical aggression were at
increased risk for high levels of use of physical aggression in adolescence, but not girls.
As physical aggression is generally higher for males, it could be that males’ observation
and modeling of peers helps to sustain a greater within-group tolerance of physical
aggression.
Together the findings from these studies, as well as others (Broidy et al., 2003;
Cleverley, Szatmari, Vaillancourt, Boyle, & Lipman, 2012; Di Giunta et al., 2010),
indicates that youth’s use of physical aggression typically follows one of two normative
trends of development or an abnormal trend. From early-life to pre-adolescence the
majority of youth (about 85%) appear to engage in low to moderate levels of physical
aggression. During this timeframe, a normative developmental trend of physical
aggression also emerges, in that most physical aggression declines as youth approach preadolescence. The amalgam of findings also draws attention to an abnormal
developmental trend of physical aggression. This more severe group (potentially clinical
populations) exhibited high levels of physical aggression in early childhood and
maintained high levels of aggression into pre-adolescence. Additionally, results from
these studies highlight differences in use of physical aggression with respect to gender, as
well as correlations between high levels of physical aggression, parenting styles, and
home life situations.
With regard to summation of findings of these studies, it is important to bear in
mind that this research on the development of physical aggression largely did not include
the next developmental period in which youths’ bodies and minds mature considerably,
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adolescence. Researchers focusing on the development of aggression during adolescence
have shown that the normative and abnormal trajectories of the pre-adolescent model
change. Brame, Nagin, and Tremblay (2001), for example, conducted a longitudinal
study tracking use of physical aggression from age 6 to 17 (n = 1,161). In their first
analysis, Brame and colleagues divided the data into the categories of childhood to preadolescence and adolescence. From this first analysis they identified three childhood to
pre-adolescence trajectories similar to other studies (Cleverley et al., 2012; Côté et al.,
2006; Di Giunta et al., 2010) and four additional adolescent trajectories. When combined
in a joint analysis, seven distinct childhood to late adolescent trajectories emerged.
Though the majority of these trajectories appear to be a breakdown dissection of the preadolescent model continuing into adolescence, most trajectories showed changes in
adolescence. Three of the groups identified displayed trajectories that were unexpected.
The first of these groups (13%) displayed declining low-aggression through the
childhood and pre-adolescent years but exhibited mild increases in physical aggression in
adolescence. (This trajectory is inconsistent with the pre-adolescent model, in which one
would hypothesize that this group would maintain or continue to decline in the use of
physical aggression in adolescence.)
The second and third groups identified in Brame and associates (2001) analysis,
were the two groups that displayed high levels of physical aggression in childhood
through preadolescence. Both of these groups did not conform well to the preadolescent
trajectories in adolescence in three ways. First, both of these highly aggressive groups
exhibited trajectories of high physical aggression that declined to almost moderate levels
of aggression, while the pre-adolescent model posits high and maintained levels into
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preadolescence. The second group (which was highly aggressive; 10%), displayed higher
levels of physical aggression before adolescence. According to the preadolescent
trajectory model, steady levels of aggression should have been observed; however, a
significant decrease in physical aggression occurred during adolescence. Last, the most
aggressive group (3%) exhibited an upsurge in physical aggression that peaked around
age 15 and then declined to the age of 17. In keeping with the pre-adolescent trajectory
model, one would posit that this group would be more likely to have lower levels of
aggression throughout adolescence, yet a very different pattern emerged. A number of
researchers have shown that this upsurge of physical aggression is fairly consistent for a
small portion of the population (Broidy et al., 2003; Jennings & Reingle, 2012; Moffitt,
2007). While evidence demonstrates changes in use of physical aggression in
adolescence, why these changes occur is still unclear. One possible explanation is that
these adolescents may employ mechanisms of moral disengagement (i.e., blaming others,
minimizing/mislabeling), allowing for externalizing behaviors to be excluded from selfevaluation. Researchers focusing on adolescence highlight the fact that trajectory
analysis of physical aggression ending in pre/early adolescence is shortsighted and lacks
acknowledgement of important developmental changes and shifts that occur throughout
adolescence (Broidy et al., 2003; Jennings & Reingle, 2012; Moffitt, 2003).
Relational Aggression. Relational (i.e., social or indirect) forms of aggression
can be overt, yet perpetrators often employ covert approaches with the intent to cause
interpersonal or social harm to others. Examples of relational aggression include eyerolling, gossiping, threats to end friendship, social exclusion, damaging relationships or
feelings of group acceptance, and spreading false rumors (Crick et al., 2006; Heilbron &
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Prinstein, 2008; ten Cate, 2011). Although relational forms of aggression share many
similar outcomes with physical aggression, relational aggression perpetration and
victimization have also been uniquely linked to youth’s individual and relational
adjustment (ten Cate, 2011). Several studies have found that relationally aggressive
behaviors are positively correlated with withdrawal, depression, peer rejection,
difficulties with friendships, and anxiety (Crick & Dodge, 1996; Crick, Grotpeter, &
Bigbee, 2002; Grotpeter & Crick, 1996). For example, in a year-long study of 3rd
graders (n = 224), Crick and colleagues (2006) found that the use of relational aggression
was associated with higher risk for peer rejection, friendship difficulties, and
internalizing problems (e.g., withdrawal, depression, anxiety). Additionally, individuals
that engaged in relational methods of aggression were more likely than non-relationally
aggressive individuals to engage in aggressive and delinquent behaviors.
Due to the less conspicuous nature of relational aggression than physical forms,
relational aggression is less detectable by others, especially adults and teachers. As a
result, individuals’ use of relational aggression could result in less social censure and
more reinforcement of socially aggressive behaviors. Yet it seems relational aggression
is detectable by peers, as evidenced by the positive associations between relational
aggression, peer rejection, and friendship difficulties (Crick et al., 2006). Perhaps, when
relationally aggressive individuals attempt to build friendships, these socially aggressive
strategies become apparent to the perspective friend and result in peer resentment and/or
friendship difficulties.
As discussed previously, it has been hypothesized that some youth may exchange
physical forms of aggression for relational forms as they mature (Côté et al., 2007;
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Heilbron & Prinstein, 2008). Youth that opt for using covert forms of aggression in place
of overt aggression may not conform to the normative development of declining
aggression (Côté et al., 2006, 2007). In a longitudinal study examining the development
of relational aggression from ages 2 to 10 (n = 1,401), researchers found that the majority
of youth (~70%) exhibited a low level use of relational aggression in childhood and that
low use persisted into pre-adolescence (Côté et al., 2007; Vaillancourt, Miller, Fagbemi,
Côté, & Tremblay, 2007). However, the other subset, about 30% mostly consisting of
females, showed more modest decreases in use of physical aggression over time with
related increases in relational aggression (Côté et al., 2007; Vaillancourt et al., 2007).
Identification of these subgroups is important, as the developmental patterns may differ
as a function of severity of behavior and gender. Authors concluded that abnormal
development of aggression in males was indicative of higher levels of physical
aggression and that abnormal development for females was associated with high levels of
relational aggression (Côté et al., 2007; Vaillancourt et al., 2007).
The continued practice and reinforcement of high levels of relational aggression
could help to explain why relationally aggressive individuals are more likely to engage in
externalizing behaviors (Crick et al., 2006). In line with previous findings that aggressive
behaviors may be learned at home, relational aggression may also be learned from peers.
In fact, studies indicate that youth learn aggressive behaviors from peers, especially in
adolescence (Prinstein & Cillessen, 2003). Reinforcement (direct or vicarious) of peer
aggression by peers may also help explain the divergent trajectories of normal and
clinical populations.
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Scholars have also proposed that aggressive forms that are used, coincide with the
most accepted behavior at a given developmental stage. The early application and use of
physical aggression, and transition/maintained use of relational aggression over the lifespan, fits well with social cognitive theory. Aggression is less tolerated as children grow
older, and since physical aggression is more observable its cessation is more pronounced.
Through modeling and vicarious reinforcement (or punishment) the use of physical
aggression would be reduced, while the use of less observable/more covert forms of
aggression may remain stable. This hypothesis is supported by findings that some males
and females seem to transition from higher levels of physical aggression to higher levels
of relational of aggression (Côté et al., 2007; Heilbron & Prinstein, 2008). This transition
to a less detectable form of aggression would be reinforced more and punished less,
allowing individuals to aggress with less social repercussions.
Functions of Aggression
Proactive aggression. Scholars suggest that proactive aggression is purposive in
nature and designed to accomplish self-serving goals (Heilbron & Prinstein, 2008).
Social cognitive theory proposes that proactive or strategic patterns of aggressive
behavior may be cultivated in social contexts as they demonstrate usefulness in obtaining
social advantages (Bandura, 1991). Accordingly, it is proposed that proactive or
purposive aggression is learned through operant and vicarious reinforcement (i.e., social
learning). In the case of proactive aggression, reinforcement would take the form of
attainment (or observation of attainment) of the goal of the aggressive behavior (e.g.,
social status or dominance).
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Results from multiple studies show increased acceptance of strategic forms of
aggression during adolescence. This increased acceptance may be due to the fact that
adolescents who engage in proactive aggression are perceived as more popular to peers
(Heilbron & Prinstein, 2008; Huang et al., 2011; Juvonen & Ho, 2008; Prinstein &
Cillessen, 2003; Rose, Swenson, & Waller, 2004). For example, in a study of 235 10th
graders, Prinstein and Cillessen (2003) found that proactive aggression was positively
correlated with high-levels of peer-perceived popularity among adolescents, whereas
reactive aggression was linked to low-levels of perceived social status. These authors
postulated that adolescents who employ the use of proactive aggression may view this
form of aggression as a tool to maintain their popularity.
These findings were further supported and advanced in a longitudinal study that
examined overt and relational aggression and perceived popularity in third, fifth, seventh,
and ninth graders (Rose et al., 2004). Rose and colleagues reported that covert forms of
aggression were more highly correlated with perceived popularity than overt aggression,
and that perceived popularity was positively linked to aggression only in older
participants. Moreover, findings revealed that relational aggression may be more socially
advantageous for adolescent females than for adolescent males (Rose et al., 2004).
From a social cognitive perspective, the findings from these two studies provide
further insight into the development of aggressive behaviors. As adolescents are
reinforced by attaining increasing social status (i.e., popularity) for strategic use of
aggression, aggressive behaviors are likely to increase, as well as become more apparent
to peers. The use of proactive or strategic forms of aggression by high-status adolescents
may even be viewed as a means of maintaining their status (Prinstein & Cillessen, 2003).
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From this social cognitive standpoint, it follows that adolescents observing the
rewards associated with peers’ strategic use of aggression (i.e., vicarious reinforcement)
should also be inclined to engage in more proactive aggression. Results from other work
support this supposition. For example, a two-year longitudinal study examining peeraggression in middle-schoolers (n = 1,260) found that peer-directed aggressive behaviors
were positively correlated with adolescents’ perception of “coolness” (i.e., high social
status; Juvonen & Ho, 2008). Additionally, findings evidenced that adolescents who
related peer-directed aggression with coolness at the beginning of the study increased in
engagement of aggression during the second year (Juvonen & Ho, 2008). Similarly,
other work indicates that the likelihood of adolescents endorsing and participating in
aggressive behaviors increased if adolescents believed that such behaviors were
sanctioned by peers with elevated social-status (Cohen & Prinstein, 2006). Findings from
these studies further support a social-cognitive explanation for the perpetration of
aggression during adolescence, as proactive aggression increases when peer-rewarded
proactive aggression is experienced or observed. Unsurprisingly, Cohen and Prinstein’s
(2006) longitudinal analysis also revealed that aggression was positively linked to social
status and negatively associated with social preference. In other words, aggressive
adolescents typically are privileged with high status, but high-status adolescents are not
liked well by their peers. As being liked by peers is associated with “coolness,” perhaps
the relationship between popularity and proactive aggression is curvilinear; meaning that
proactive aggression helps with popularity, only up to a point, after which peers like
aggressors less thereby reducing their popularity.
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Reactive Aggression. Reactive aggression has been defined as “a response to
antecedent conditions of provocation or frustration that tend to be interpersonal and
hostile” (Heilbron & Prinstein, 2008, p. 180). In other words, reactive aggression occurs
in response to aggression from others, and responses are, by and large, emotionally
charged, lack control, and are intended to inflict harm. Unlike proactive aggression,
reactive aggression is enacted with little to no benefit to reactive aggressors (Liu, 2004).
An example of reactive aggression would be a teen verbally or physically lashing out at a
peer that hurt his or her feelings. Reactive aggression outbursts initially produce
increased attention from peers, which may act as a reinforcement for reactive aggression;
however, these outbursts also violate social norms, resulting in different long-term
outcomes than proactive aggression.
Reactive aggression has been linked to low-social status in adolescence (Prinstein
& Cillessen, 2003). For example, in a meta-analysis of 42 studies, Card and Little (2006)
found that reactive aggression was more strongly negatively correlated with prosocial
behaviors and more strongly positively highly correlated to maladjustment than proactive
aggression. As reactive aggression typically lacks planning and is spontaneous in nature,
this response pattern does not correspond with the need in adolescence to develop the
ability to evaluate situations, produce hypothetical and alternative courses of action, and
make informed independent decisions (Beckert, 2007). Considering that these forethinking abilities are cultivated and developed largely in adolescence, it stands to reason
that lack of development of evaluative thinking in adolescence leaves adults ill-equipped
to deal with adult situations presented in adulthood (Beckert, 2007).
Cognitive Distortions
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Cognitive distortions have been defined as “inaccurate or biased ways of
attending to, or conferring, meaning upon experiences” (Barriga, Gibbs, et al., 2001, p.
1). Research and theory divide cognitive distortions into two categories: primary and
secondary cognitive distortions (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996). Primary cognitive distortions
(i.e., self-centered) originate from a bias that is egotistic in nature and occur when an
individual’s needs, wants, and views are regarded as so important that expectations,
wants, needs, and legitimate views of others are completely disregarded or not fully taken
into consideration (Barriga, Gibbs, et al., 2001; Nas et al., 2008). In early to middle
childhood an egocentric viewpoint is common, but typically decreases as children mature
(Côté et al., 2007; Heilbron & Prinstein, 2008). Importantly, juveniles that engage in
delinquent behaviors have been shown to have a greater propensity for primary/selfserving cognitive distortions (Barriga, Morrison, et al., 2001; ten Cate, 2011). High
levels of primary cognitive distortions have also been correlated with lower levels of
empathy and developmental delays in social perspective taking and moral judgement
(Barriga, Morrison, et al., 2001; Barriga, Sullivan-Cosetti, & Gibbs, 2009).
Secondary cognitive distortions include assuming the worst, blaming others, and
minimizing/mislabeling, and are rationalizations that are employed before or after
externalizing behaviors to neutralize empathy, guilt, and conscience (Bandura, 1991; Nas
et al., 2008). Use of secondary cognitive distortions allows for protection of one’s selfimage while engaging in socially inappropriate behaviors (Barriga et al., 2009; Nas et al.,
2008). Moral development scholars describe secondary cognitive distortions as
“mechanisms of moral disengagement” that help to form moral judgements that distort
and rationalize facts, allowing externalizing behaviors to be disassociated from self-
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assessment (Bandura, 1991; Barriga, Gibbs, et al., 2001; Barriga, Morrison, et al., 2001;
ten Cate, 2011).
With regard to moral issues, social cognitive theory postulates that moral thought,
environments, affect, and behavior influence one another in triadic-reciprocal manner.
Through these mutual interactions, cognitive restructuring of moral systems can change
perspectives so that externalizing behaviors are viewed as acceptable. The result of this
process is that harmful behaviors are viewed as serving moral purposes and are thereby
considered to be personally and socially appropriate by individuals with cognitive
distortions. Harm inflicted is perceived by the aggressor as unanticipated, unintentional,
or blame is placed on the victim or situational factors. Doing so allows the aggressor to
distort, minimize, or ignore harm to others, resulting in little to no self-reproach.
Individuals that continue to engage in behaviors that are justified by way of secondary
cognitive distortions become more accepting of behaviors that would originally foster
guilt. Irrational patterns of thought contribute to faulty assessments of social situations,
and inaccurate appraisals of social situations increase the probability of inappropriate or
externalizing responses, resulting in flawed moral judgment (Bandura, 1991). Consistent
with these notions, several studies have shown positive correlations between cognitive
distortions and externalizing behaviors (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Barriga, Hawkins, &
Camelia, 2008).
In one study, van Leeuwen, Rodgers, Gibbs, and Chabrol (2014) investigated the
effects primary and secondary cognitive distortions on antisocial behaviors in a sample of
high school students (n = 972) and found that primary cognitive distortions significantly
mediated the relationship between secondary cognitive distortions and antisocial
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behaviors. In addition to these findings, researchers also found that secondary cognitive
distortions significantly mediated the relationship between primary cognitive distortions.
The combination of these findings does not clarify which comes first but suggests that
both primary and secondary cognitive distortions contribute to antisocial behaviors. A
different study of 724 high school students examining the relationship between antisocial
behaviors and primary and secondary cognitive distortions found that primary cognitive
distortions were positively correlated with aggressive behavior and were more prevalent
in students scoring in the clinical range (van der Velden, Brugman, Boom, & Koops,
2010). Additionally, longitudinal analyses suggested that primary cognitive distortions
may have been preceded by antisocial behaviors. Social-cognitive theory would suggest
that initially secondary cognitive distortions may be employed after engaging in
antisocial behaviors, and that continued use of secondary cognitive distortions may lead
to the formation of primary cognitive distortions. It also is predictable that students
scoring in the clinical range would have a higher rate of cognitive distortions, as
cognitive distortions would be needed to justify antisocial behavior.
As expected, findings from multiple studies suggest that cognitive distortions are
more prevalent in clinical populations than nonclinical populations. One such study
examined differences in cognitive distortions and levels of moral judgement between
incarcerated and non-incarcerated adolescents (Lardén, Melin, Holst, & Långström,
2006). Researchers compared 58 incarcerated and 58 “typical” adolescents matching for
age, gender, socio-economic status, and ethnicity. Adolescent self-reports revealed that
incarcerated adolescents had more cognitive distortions than “typical” adolescents.
Additionally, incarcerated youth displayed less mature moral judgements when compared
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to “typical” adolescents. Social cognitive theory would explain the lack of maturity in
moral judgement as a result of constant use of secondary cognitive distortions to protect
the self from self-censure. As secondary cognitive distortions protect self-image while
engaging in antisocial behaviors, it is expected that individuals that engage in
externalizing behaviors would employ them more often (Bandura, 1991).
In a more recent study, researchers compared levels of cognitive distortions in
clinical and normal populations (Wallinius, Johansson, Larden, & Dernevik, 2011).
Results demonstrated that cognitive distortions were more widespread in clinical
populations, echoing findings from other studies (Brazão et al., 2015; Frick & White,
2008; Gini, Pozzoli, & Hymel, 2014; Hoogsteder, Wissink, Stams, van Horn, &
Hendriks, 2014). Consistent with a social-cognitive perspective, cognitive distortions can
protect individuals’ self-images when engaging in antisocial behaviors; without these
distortions, individuals would self-censure more frequently and feel more remorse for
actions inflicting harm on others. How cognitive distortions are associated with
externalizing behaviors makes sense, but they do not explain changes in rates of
externalizing behaviors during adolescence. One possible explanation for these changes
in externalizing behaviors during adolescence is the formation of cognitive autonomy.
Autonomy
Adolescence is a time in which the brain and body undergo changes that result in
increased emotions, body size and weight, freedom and autonomy, and cognitive ability.
The prefrontal cortex begins to develop in early adolescence and continues to slowly
mature throughout adolescence. This portion of the brain is associated with executive
functions and control, self-regulation, contingency planning, hypothetical thinking, and
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long-term planning (Steinberg, 2004, 2011; Steinberg & Silverberg, 1989). Around the
same time as the prefrontal cortex begins to develop, the dopaminergic system also
begins to develop. Unlike the slow maturation of the prefrontal cortex, the dopaminergic
system develops quite quickly, flooding the prefrontal cortex with dopamine (Casey,
Getz, & Galvan, 2008; Crowley et al., 2015; Steinberg, 2010). The fast development of
the dopaminergic system in early adolescence marks a lifetime peak in dopamine
production (Steinberg, 2008). While the slow development of the adolescent prefrontal
cortex allows for increased cognitive abilities such as abstract thinking and hypothetical
thought, the accelerated development of the dopaminergic system often renders
adolescents ill-equipped to make adult-like decisions and act autonomously (Casey,
Galvan, & Hare, 2005; Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2008).
Autonomy has been generally described as an individual’s ability to “rule one’s
self” and is central to development (Beckert, 2005). Erikson (1967) was one of the
earliest and most prominent theorists to look at autonomy. Due to Erikson’s inclusion of
autonomy in his second developmental stage “autonomy versus shame and doubt,”
autonomy was originally pigeon-holed as the primary task of toddlerhood. Today, many
developmentalists acknowledge that the pursuit of autonomy is also central to adolescent
development. Since Erikson, the construct of autonomy has been divided into three
dimensions by scholars: behavioral, emotional, and cognitive. Behavioral autonomy
concerns the ability to act independently and emotional autonomy concerns becoming
emotionally independent. Importantly, neither of these dimensions of autonomy are
unique to adolescence (Beckert, 2012; Steinberg et al., 2008). Cognitive autonomy is
unique to adolescence as it involves new ways of thinking that are not used prior to
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adolescence. As such, cognitive autonomy offers possible explanations to changes in
externalizing behaviors for both normal and clinical populations.
Cognitive Autonomy
Cognitive autonomy concerns the ability to think for oneself (Beckert, 2005) and
includes the ability to listen to others’ opinions, consider, take into account others’
perspectives, generate and anticipate possible consequences for one’s self and for others,
and to make independent decisions (Steinberg, 2008). Social-cognitive theory views this
development as a gradual process of cognitive self-regulation that is constructed from
past interactions with the environment (Zimmer-Gembeck & Collins, 2003). Facilitated
by the previously mentioned development in the brain, these changes allow for complex
and abstract thought processes that continue to grow through adolescence and adulthood.
While the ability to make informed decisions independently is highly valued in
adulthood, the construct of cognitive autonomy has not been investigated as deeply as the
other dimensions of autonomy by the academic community. The sparsity of investigation
into cognitive autonomy is largely because behavioral and emotional autonomy are more
easily observable. Correspondingly, measurement of a less observable construct like
autonomy has been more difficult.
Autonomy researchers signaled the need for a cognitive component long before
its introduction. In the past, autonomy scholars have introduced constructs incongruent
with both emotional and behavioral dimensions of autonomy, including goal setting
(Allen, Hauser, Bell, & O’Connor, 1994; Markus, 1987), decision making (Frank, Avery,
& Laman, 1988), attitudinal independence and autonomy (Bandura, 1977; Noom,
Deković, & Meeus, 2001), and contemplating consequences (Trad, 1994). Despite their
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long-standing relevance, reliable measurement for many of these constructs was
problematic (Beckert, 2005). Addressing the limitation of measurement, Beckert (2005)
proposed that the construct must be observable and result in a “product that is unique to
cognitive autonomy” (p. 13). Beckert proposed the construct of self-evaluation as this
product due to the need for executive thought processes and its internal nature. To this
end, Beckert (2007) proposed and validated The Cognitive Autonomy and SelfEvaluation (CASE) inventory. The CASE inventory consists of five observable
constructs, previously identified by scholars, related to cognitive autonomy and the
product of self-evaluation: evaluative thought (i.e., consequence calculation/evaluation
and perspective taking), comparative validation (i.e., influence weighing others’
opinions), decision making (informed and independent), self-assessment (e.g. selfevaluation), and voicing opinions (educated opinions at appropriate times). This
refinement in measurement has facilitated quantitative analyses of the cognitive
autonomy construct.
One recent investigation assessed the associations between cognitive autonomy,
texting volume, and attachment of high schoolers in northern Utah (n = 180; Cutler,
2014). Researchers found that females scored lower than males on four of the five
cognitive autonomy subscales and that lower scores were associated with higher rates of
self-reported texting. (Correspondingly, females also scored higher in attachment
measures than males.) These findings conform to previous research indicating that males
tend to be more autonomous than females (Zimmer-Gembeck & Collins, 2003; ZimmerGembeck, Madsen, & Hanisch, 2011).
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Traditionally, autonomy has been valued more by individualistic cultures than
collectivistic ones (Lee, Beckert, & Goodrich, 2010). Researchers conducted a study to
compare whether levels of cognitive autonomy varied as a function of cultural orientation
(individualistic, collectivistic, and transitional) in Taiwanese school students (n = 781)
(Lee et al., 2010). Results suggested that there were not significant differences between
cultural identifications, but there were significant gender differences in levels of
cognitive autonomy. Lee and colleagues noted that this was likely due to the fact that
Taiwanese culture generally values males above females. When comparing levels of
cognitive autonomy between American (n = 330) and Taiwanese (n = 376) high
schoolers, cultural differences were more pronounced (Beckert, Lee, & Vaterlaus, 2012).
Findings indicated that Taiwanese students were more likely to have higher scores in the
area of evaluative thinking than their American counterparts, whereas Americans were
likely to be higher in the other four constructs. Additionally, gender differences were
more prevalent among Taiwanese students than American students. Males typically
scored higher in the domains of self-assessing, evaluative thinking, comparative
validation, and voicing opinions, providing evidence that males tend to be more
cognitively autonomous than females in non-clinical populations.
Cognitive Autonomy in Clinical Populations
From a theoretical standpoint, adolescents that engage in evaluative thought
should be able to weigh possible outcomes allowing them to make informed and
independent decisions leading to positive outcomes (Beckert, 2007). Yet, the limited
research examining adolescent clinical populations indicates that this relationship does
not exist. One such study examined the effect of wilderness therapy on cognitive
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autonomy and self-efficacy in a clinical sample of Israeli youth (Margalit & Ben-Ari,
2014). Participants were divided into three conditions: intervention, partial intervention,
and control. Researchers found that youth in the intervention and partial intervention
groups both showed statistically significant gains in levels of cognitive autonomy and
decision-making abilities over the control group, with the intervention group showing the
greatest increases. These findings illustrate that therapy can be used to increase levels of
cognitive autonomy and decision-making abilities. Conceptually, increases in cognitive
autonomy should result in decreases in antisocial behaviors; yet, researchers found no
associations between increases in cognitive autonomy and antisocial behaviors.
Other researchers compared levels of cognitive autonomy between normative and
clinical populations (Reiser, 2007). Generally speaking, Reiser found little to no
differences between the cognitive autonomy levels of students from a public high school
(n = 137) and adolescents (ages 14-18) from a residential treatment center (n = 119). The
one exception to this was that ninth-grade high school females reported greater cognitive
autonomy (in all areas except for comparative validation) than ninth graders in residential
treatment. Interestingly, alpha coefficients for the evaluative thinking subscale were
significantly lower in the clinical population. While these findings indicate that levels of
cognitive autonomy between community and clinical populations are more similar than
different, they also are puzzling. Theoretically, higher levels of cognitive autonomy
should allow adolescents evaluate potential outcomes and thus protect youth from
engaging in antisocial behaviors that result in undesirable outcomes; yet clinical and
normal populations show negligible differences in levels of cognitive autonomy. If levels
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of cognitive autonomy are similar between normative and clinical populations, why are
some adolescents engaging in problem behaviors and others not?
The Present Study
Cognitive distortions are more prevalent in clinical populations and have been
positively correlated with problem behaviors. Additionally, as cognitive autonomy
develops, youth gradually rely less on others during assessment and decision-making
processes. For typical adolescents, this transition should be correlated with positive
outcomes and decreases in antisocial behaviors (Beckert, 2007). However, this
evaluative process may be compromised for youth (especially those in clinical
populations) that are unknowingly employing cognitive distortions. The opinions of
parents and peers that may have guided or helped provide more accurate assessments and
may be valued less as cognitive autonomy develops (Beckert, 2007, 2012), and even
more so by youth that employ mechanisms of moral disengagement (i.e. secondary
cognitive distortions; Bandura, 1991, 2001). Thus, increased cognitive autonomy may
exacerbate the implications of flawed evaluations (i.e., cognitive distortions) and be
connected to more negative outcomes. In other words, youth’s cognitive distortions may
have greater influence than before cognitive autonomy started to develop. Until now
analysis of the relation between cognitive distortions and externalizing behaviors has not
included the construct of cognitive autonomy. The theoretical interaction between
cognitive distortions and cognitive autonomy and the possible implications offer a
compelling case that could help provide insight into the differing outcomes in normal and
clinical populations.
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The present study aimed to fill this gap by examining whether cognitive
autonomy moderates the association between cognitive distortions and externalizing
behaviors in a sample of youth from a residential treatment facility. The first aim
investigated whether a relationship between cognitive distortions and externalizing
behaviors existed in a clinical population of adolescents. Consistent with past
research(Barriga et al., 2008, 2000), it was hypothesized that cognitive distortions would
be positively associated with externalizing behaviors. The second aim was to investigate
whether cognitive autonomy moderated the relationship between cognitive distortions
and externalizing behaviors in a clinical population of adolescents. Given the focal
population, it was hypothesized that cognitive distortions would be more strongly related
to externalizing behaviors when levels of cognitive autonomy were high as opposed to
low.

METHODS
Participants
Data for this study were originally collected as part of the admission process at a
residential treatment center in the mountain west area of the United States. Though
previously collected, this data had not been analyzed in reference to the variables of
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cognitive distortion, cognitive autonomy, or externalizing behaviors. Although there were
two waves of data collection, in order to avoid contaminating potential associations with
participants’ treatment, the present study focused only on data from when adolescents
were admitted to the facility. At admission, there were 81 male and 65 female adolescents
ranging from age 10 to age 17. The sample was modestly diverse: 73.8% Caucasian,
10.3% Hispanic, 10.3% African American, 2% Other, 1% Asian, 0.5% Peruvian, 0.5%
Pacific Islander, 0.5% Native American, 0.5% Multi-Ethnic, and 0.5% African. About
one third of the sample was adopted.
Procedures
The data for this study were collected by the residential treatment center as part of
the program’s internal program evaluation. Data for this study was collected from late
2014 to the present. Parent permission and youth assent for potential participation was
obtained during the admission process. Participating youth completed web-based
questionnaires (including demographic questions and surveys) on personal computers via
Qualtrics software within one month of entrance into the residential treatment center
during afterschool hours. Completion of the questionnaires ranged from 45 to 75 minutes
for most students. After receiving written authorization from the residential treatment
center and Utah State University IRB approval has been obtained, this data set was
requested from the residential treatment center without any identifying information that
could potentially be linked back to the participants.
Measures
Externalizing Behaviors
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The Youth Self-Report (YSR) for ages 11-18 (Achenbach, 2001) was used to
measure externalizing behaviors. The YSR consists of 112 questions measured on a
Likert scale ranging from 0 (not true) to 2 (very true or often true). Scores on the YSR
contribute to eight subscales of syndromes as well as six subscales relating to DSM
diagnosis; across all subscales higher scores are associated with more severe diagnosis.
Of the eight syndrome-related subscales, aggressive behavior (17 questions) and rulebreaking behavior (15 questions) subscales were summed to compute the externalizing
scale of the YSR. Sample items for these subscales include: “I get in many fights” and “I
disobey at school.” The externalizing scale of the YSR has a reported alpha coefficient
of .90 (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001b; Ebesutani, Bernstein, Martinez, Chorpita, &
Weisz, 2011; Ivanova et al., 2007), indicating good internal reliability. The alpha
coefficient for the externalizing scale for this study was .87. Achenbach provided
evidence of criterion validity and content validity through discrimination between
referred and non-referred, demographically matched youth (Achenbach, 1991b;
Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001b). Subsequent studies have also provided evidence of
factor-analytic, content, convergent, and discriminant validity across 23 languages and
cultures (Achenbach et al., 2002; Ivanova et al., 2007; Izutsu et al., 2005; Leung et al.,
2006; Nakamura, Ebesutani, Bernstein, & Chorpita, 2009; Rescorla et al., 2013).
Cognitive Distortions
The How I Think (HIT) questionnaire was used to measure four areas of cognitive
distortions. The HIT contains 54 questions that are measured on a 6-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The cognitive distortions
portion of the HIT consisted of 39 questions divided among each of the four individual
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cognitive distortion subscales: self-centered (9), blaming others (10),
minimizing/mislabeling (9), and assuming the worst (11). Scores were summed for each
of the four subscales, resulting in a separate score for each type of cognitive distortion.
Higher scores in each subscale are associated with higher levels of cognitive distortions
only in that subscale or type. For example, an individual may have high levels of
cognitive distortions in the blaming others category and have a low score in the assuming
the worst type. Sample questions include: “I have to lie sometimes to get what I want”
and “People are always trying to start fights with me.” Barriga et al. (2001) reported
alpha coefficients ranging from .79 to .83 indicating good internal reliability. Alpha
coefficients for this study ranged from .83 to .87. Concerning the validity of this measure,
authors provided evidence of content, factor-analytic, convergent, divergent,
discriminant, and construct validity (Barriga, Gibbs, et al., 2001). Subsequent studies
have evaluated the HIT in the Spanish, Italian, Danish, French, and Bengali languages
and cultures providing similar evidence of factor analytic validity, convergent and
divergent validity, and concurrent validity (Bacchini, De Angelis, Affuso, & Brugman,
2016; Nas et al., 2008; Peña Fernández, Andreu Rodríguez, Barriga, & Gibbs, 2013;
Plante et al., 2012; Rezaul Karim & Begum, 2016; van der Velden, Brugman, Boom, &
Koops, 2010; van Leeuwen, Chauchard, Chabrol, & Gibbs, 2013; van Leeuwen et al.,
2014).

Cognitive Autonomy
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The Cognitive Autonomy and Self-Evaluation (CASE) inventory was used to
assess levels of adolescent cognitive autonomy. The CASE inventory consists of 27
questions measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never or strongly disagree)
to 5 (always or strongly agree) with some items that were reverse coded. This study
used two of the five subscales that constitute the framework of the CASE inventory,
specifically the subscales of evaluative thinking (eight questions) and decision making
(six questions). Sample items include: “I think about the consequences of my decision”
and “I am better at decision making than my friends.” The validity of this measure was
originally established by Beckert (2007). The Cronbach alpha coefficients for each
subscale in this study were .89 for evaluative thinking and .80 for decision-making.
These findings are consistent with previous studies (Cutler, 2014; Davis, 2010; Lee &
Beckert, 2012) indicating good internal consistency.
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RESULTS
Prior to analyses, assumptions were tested to determine if the data fit linear
regression assumptions of linearity, normality, homoscedasticity, and lack of
multicollinearity. Initially, the frequency distribution and descriptive statistics for each
demographic, dependent, and independent variable was examined. Starting with
demographic variables, this sample consisted of 146 youth ranging from age 10 to 17
with a mean age of 15.32 (SD = 1.61). Fifty-five percent of the participants were male
(45% female). Due to small numbers of participants in ethnic minority groups, the ethnic
composition of the sample was dichotomized (0 = White; 1 = non-white); 77.4% of the
sample were Caucasian and 23.6% were non-White. Adopted youth made up 36.3% of
the sample (0 = not adopted; 1 = adopted). The dependent variable, externalizing
behaviors, held a mean of 19.51 (SD = 9.51). For cognitive distortion variables, selfcentered had a mean of 2.65 (SD = .87), blaming others produced a mean of 2.39 (SD =
.87), minimizing guilt had a mean of 2.38 (SD = .90), and the mean of assuming the
worst was 2.84 (SD = .79). The two cognitive autonomy variables of evaluative thinking
and decision-making had means of 26.07 (SD = 6.70) and 22.81 (SD = 4.45),
respectively. Skewness and kurtosis values for the demographic, dependent, and
independent variables fell within the standards of ± 2, indicating normal distributions (see
Table 1).
To determine if multicollinearity was present between variables, a series of
Pearson bivariate correlations were performed first (see Table 1). Only two correlations
were found: (a) age was weakly positively correlated with decision-making; and (b)
adoption weakly positively correlated with ethnicity. With regard to the dependent
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variable externalizing behaviors, Pearson bivariate correlations revealed moderate
positive correlations between cognitive distortion independent variables (self-centered
thoughts, blaming others, minimizing guilt, assuming the worst), and weak negative
correlations with cognitive autonomy independent variables (evaluative thinking,
decision-making). Cognitive distortion variables were strongly positively correlated one
with another. They were also weakly negatively correlated with evaluative thinking;
however, only assuming the worst was also weakly negatively correlated with decisionmaking. Decision-making was moderately positively correlated with evaluative thinking.
Variance inflation factors (VIF) were then explored to test for multicollinearity within the
multiple regression framework. Across analyses VIF values ranged from 1.5 - 5.6, within
acceptable values (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998), signifying a lack of
multicollinearity. While correlations between externalizing behaviors and cognitive
distortion variables were moderate, this was expected as these variables have been shown
to be predictive in the past. Scatterplots were examined for the assumptions of
homoscedasticity and linear relationship. Scatterplots of both independent and dependent
variables showed no heteroscedasticity and no curvilinear relationships.
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.79**

.51**
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-.085
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7
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.84**

.54**

-.16

.11

-.13
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8

-.07

.04

.11

-.074
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-.38**

.84** -.32**

.84** -.24**

.77** -.27**

.57** -.40**

-.07
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-.13

.14

9

Means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis for demographic, dependent, and independent variables

Table 1

.50**

-.29**

.14

.10

.06

-.24**

.19*

-.087

.025

.29**

11
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Hierarchical linear regression analyses were performed to determine if significant
relationships existed between the dependent variable (i.e., externalizing behaviors) and
the independent variables (i.e., individual dimensions of cognitive distortion and
cognitive autonomy) and to test for moderation effects, resulting in eight separate
analyses. Each of these analyses consisted of three models. Model 1 included the control
variables, specifically age at entry, ethnicity (0 = White; 1 = non-White), adopted status
(0 = not adopted; 1 = adopted), and gender (0 = female; 1 = male). Model 2 included one
cognitive distortion variable and one cognitive autonomy variable (for all analyses, all
cognitive distortion and cognitive autonomy variables were centered at their means); and
Model 3 tested for moderation using the product term of the two centered variables from
model 2, for each combination of independent variables.
The first analysis regressed externalizing behaviors on the cognitive distortion
variable self-centered thinking and the cognitive autonomy variable evaluative thinking.
Model 1 indicated that the control variables were not associated with externalizing
behaviors (see Table 2). The results from Model 2 accounted for 38% of the total
variance in youth’s externalizing behaviors. Consistent with expectations, self-centered
thinking was positively related to externalizing behaviors. Inconsistent with expectations
for this population, evaluative thinking was negatively (not positively) associated with
externalizing behaviors (see Table 2). Further, Model 3 revealed the evaluative thinking
did not moderate the relationship between self-centered thoughts and externalizing
behaviors (see Table 2).
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Table 2
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression of Self-Centered Thoughts and
Evaluative Thinking Predicting Externalizing Behaviors (N = 146)
Model 1
Model 2
Variable
b
SE B
β
b
SE B
β
b
Age at Entry
-0.04 0.50
-0.01 -0.21
0.40
-0.04
-0.21
Adopted
-0.65 1.70
-0.03 -0.24
1.36
-0.01
-0.24
Ethnicity
-1.00 1.99
-0.04 -1.72
1.60
-0.08
-1.72
Gender
-2.03 1.60
-0.11 -2.28
1.28
-0.12
-2.28
Self-Centered
-5.36
0.76
-0.49** -5.36
Evaluative
-0.36
0.10
-0.26** -0.36
Self-Centered X
-0.00
Evaluative
2
R
0.01
0.38
F for change in R2
0.49
41.86**
Note. Self-Centered thoughts and evaluative thinking were centered at their means
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Model 3
SE B
β
0.40 -0.04
1.37 -0.01
1.63 -0.08
1.28 -0.12
0.77 -0.49**
0.10 -0.26**
0.11

-0.00

0.38
0.00

The second analysis regressed externalizing behaviors on the cognitive distortion
variable blaming others and the cognitive autonomy variable evaluative thinking. Model
1 indicated that the control variables were not associated with externalizing behaviors
(see Table 3). The results from Model 2 accounted for 39% of the total variance in
youth’s externalizing behaviors. In line with hypotheses, blaming others was positively
related to externalizing behaviors. Contrary to hypotheses for this population, evaluative
thinking was negatively (not positively) associated with externalizing behaviors (see
Table 3). Also, not in line with hypotheses, Model 3 revealed the evaluative thinking did
not moderate the relationship between blaming others and externalizing behaviors (see
Table 3).
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Table 3
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression of Blaming Others and Evaluative
Thinking Predicting Externalizing Behaviors (N = 146)
Model 1
Model 2
Variable
b
SE B
β
b
SE B
β
Age at Entry
-0.04
0.50
-0.01
0.52
0.40
-0.09
Adopted
0.65
1.70
0.03
-0.73
1.36
-0.04
Ethnicity
1.00
1.99
0.04
0.84
1.59
-0.04
Gender
-2.03
1.60
-0.11
-3.52
1.30
-0.18
Evaluative
-0.39
0.10
-0.28**
Blaming
5.48
0.78
-0.50**
Blaming X
Evaluative
R2
0.01
0.39
F for change in R2
0.49
42.18**
Note. Blaming others and evaluative thinking were centered at their means
*p < .05. **p < .01.

b
-0.51
-0.74
-0.82
-3.52
-0.39
-5.46

Model 3
SE B
β
0.41 -0.09
1.37 -0.04
1.60 -0.04
1.31 -0.18
0.10 -0.28**
0.79 -0.50**

-0.01

0.10

-0.01

0.39
0.01

The third analysis regressed externalizing behaviors on the cognitive distortion
variable minimizing/mislabeling and the cognitive autonomy variable evaluative
thinking. Model 1 indicated that the control variables were not associated with
externalizing behaviors (see Table 4). The results from Model 2 accounted for 39% of
the total variance in youth’s externalizing behaviors. Consistent with expectations,
minimizing/mislabeling was positively related to externalizing behaviors. Inconsistent
with hypotheses for this population, evaluative thinking was inversely (not positively)
associated with externalizing behaviors (see Table 4). Finally, Model 3 revealed the
evaluative thinking did not moderate the relationship between minimizing/mislabeling
and externalizing behaviors (see Table 4).
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Table 4
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression of Minimizing/Mislabeling Blame and
Evaluative Thinking Predicting Externalizing Behaviors (N = 146)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Variable
b
SE B
β
b
SE B
β
b
SE B
β
Age at Entry
-0.04 0.50 -0.01 0.30
0.40
0.05
0.30 0.40
0.05
Adopted
0.65 1.70
0.03 -0.97
1.36
-0.05
-1.01 1.36 -0.05
Ethnicity
1.00 1.99
0.04 1.42
1.59
0.06
1.23 1.62
0.05
Gender
-2.03 1.60 -0.11 -3.30
1.29
-0.17
-3.31 1.29 -0.17
Evaluative
-0.33
0.10
-0.23** -0.34 0.10 -0.24**
Minimizing
5.42
0.76
0.51**
5.36 0.76
0.51**
Minimizing X
-0.07 0.11 -0.04
Evaluative
2
R
0.01
0.39
0.39
F for change in R2
0.49
43.01**
0.40
Note. Minimizing/mislabeling and evaluative thinking were centered at their means
*p < .05. **p < .01.

The fourth analysis regressed externalizing behaviors on the cognitive distortion
variable assuming the worst and the cognitive autonomy variable evaluative thinking.
Model 1 indicated that the control variables were not associated with externalizing
behaviors (see Table 5). The results from Model 2 accounted for 39% of the total
variance in youth’s externalizing behaviors. Consistent with expectations, assuming the
worst was positively related to externalizing behaviors. Contrary to expectations for this
population, evaluative thinking was negatively (not positively) associated with
externalizing behaviors (see Table 5). Additionally, Model 3 revealed the evaluative
thinking did not significantly moderate the relationship between assuming the worst and
externalizing behaviors (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression of Assuming the Worst and Evaluative
Thinking Predicting Externalizing Behaviors (N = 146)
Model 1
Model 2
Variable
b
SE B
β
b
SE B
β
b
Age at Entry
-0.04 0.50 -0.01 0.48
0.40
0.08
0.48
Adopted
0.65
1.70
0.03 -1.17
1.36
-0.06
-1.17
Ethnicity
1.00
1.99
0.04 0.63
1.58
0.03
0.64
Gender
-2.03 1.60 -0.11 -2.48
1.27
-0.13
-2.48
Evaluative
-0.29
0.10
-0.21** -0.29
Assuming
6.28
0.88
0.52**
6.29
Assuming X
0.00
Evaluative
2
R
0.01
0.39
F for change in R2
0.49
42.98**
Note. Assuming the worst and evaluative thinking were centered at their means
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Model 3
SE B
β
0.40
0.08
1.37 -0.06
1.60
0.03
1.28 -0.13
0.10 -0.21**
0.89
0.52**
0.10

0.00

0.39
0.00

The fifth analysis regressed externalizing behaviors on the cognitive distortion
variable self-centered thinking and the cognitive autonomy variable decision-making.
Model 1 indicated that the control variables were not associated with externalizing
behaviors (see Table 6). The results from Model 2 accounted for 37% of the total
variance in youth’s externalizing behaviors. In line with hypotheses, self-centered
thinking was positively related to externalizing behaviors. Conflicting with hypotheses
for this population, decision-making was negatively associated with externalizing
behaviors (see Table 6). Also incongruent with hypotheses, Model 3 revealed the
decision-making did not significantly moderate the relationship between self-centered
thoughts and externalizing behaviors (see Table 6).
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Table 6
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression of Self-Centered Thoughts and
Decision-Making Predicting Externalizing Behaviors (N = 146)
Model 1
Model 2
Variable
b
SE B
β
b
SE B
β
b
Age at Entry
-0.04 0.50 -0.01 0.44
0.42
0.08
0.42
Adopted
0.65 1.70
0.03 0.32
1.37
0.02
0.34
Ethnicity
1.00 1.99
0.04 2.52
1.61
0.11
2.24
Gender
-2.03 1.60 -0.11 -1.89
1.32
-0.10
-1.73
Self-Centered
6.03
0.74
0.55**
6.17
Decision
-0.46
0.15
-0.22** -0.49
Self-Centered X
-0.14
Decision
2
R
0.01
0.37
F for change in R2
0.49
38.78**
Note. Self-Centered thoughts and decision-making were centered at their means
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Model 3
SE B
β
0.42
0.07
1.37
0.02
1.66
0.10
1.33 -0.09
0.77
0.57**
0.16 -0.23**
0.18

-0.06

0.37
0.57

The sixth analysis regressed externalizing behaviors on the cognitive distortion
variable blaming others and the cognitive autonomy variable decision-making. Model 1
indicated that the control variables were not associated with externalizing behaviors (see
Table 7). The results from Model 2 accounted for 35% of the total variance in youth’s
externalizing behaviors. Harmonious with proposed hypotheses, blaming others was
positively related to externalizing behaviors. Discordant with hypotheses for this
population, decision-making was negatively associated with externalizing behaviors (see
Table 7). Also contradictory with expectations, Model 3 revealed the decision-making
did not significantly moderate the relationship between blaming others and externalizing
behaviors (see Table 7).
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Table 7
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression of Blaming Others and Decision-Making
Externalizing Behaviors (N = 146)
Model 1

Model 2

Variable
b
SE B
β
b
SE B
β
-0.04
0.50
-0.01
0.73
0.43
0.12
Age at Entry
0.65
1.70
0.03 -0.16
1.39
-0.01
Adopted
1.00
1.99
0.04
1.54
1.63
0.07
Ethnicity
-2.03
1.60
-0.11 -3.35
1.36
-0.18
Gender
-0.41
0.16
-0.19**
Decision
6.03
0.78
0.55**
Blaming
Blaming X
Decision
0.01
0.35
R2
0.49
35.85**
F for change in R2
Note. Blaming others and decision-making were centered at their means
*p < .05. **p < .01.

b
0.75
-0.12
1.79
-3.47
-0.41
6.02

Model 3
SE
B
β
0.43 0.13
1.40 -0.01
1.67 0.08
1.38 -0.18
0.16 -0.19**
0.78 0.55**

0.10

0.14

0.05

0.35
0.44

The seventh analysis regressed externalizing behaviors on the cognitive distortion
variable minimizing/mislabeling and the cognitive autonomy variable decision-making.
Model 1 indicated that the control variables were not associated with externalizing
behaviors (see Table 8). The results from Model 2 accounted for 37% of the total
variance in youth’s externalizing behaviors. In agreement with the expected findings,
minimizing/mislabeling was positively related to externalizing behaviors. Contradictory
with expectations for this population, decision-making was negatively associated with
externalizing behaviors (see Table 8). Inconsistent with expectations, Model 3 revealed
the decision-making did not significantly moderate the relationship between
minimizing/mislabeling and externalizing behaviors (see Table 8).
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Table 8
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression of Minimizing/Mislabeling Blame
and Decision-Making Predicting Externalizing Behaviors (N = 146)
Model 1
Model 2
Variable
b
SE B
β
b
SE B
β
b
Age at Entry
-0.04 0.50 -0.01 0.46
0.42
0.08
0.45
Adopted
0.65 1.70
0.03 -0.54
1.38
-0.03
-0.55
Ethnicity
1.00 1.99
0.04 2.06
1.61
0.09
1.85
Gender
-2.03 1.60 -0.11 -3.17
1.34
-0.17
-3.12
Decision
-0.34
0.16
-0.16* -0.34
Minimizing
5.97
0.74
0.57** 6.02
Minimizing x
-0.08
Decision
2
R
0.01
0.37
F for change in R2
0.49
38.67**
Note. Minimizing/mislabeling and decision-making were centered at their means
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Model 3
SE B
β
0.42
0.08
1.38 -0.03
1.66
0.08
1.35 -0.16
0.16 -0.16*
0.75
0.57**
0.16

-0.04

0.37
0.26

The final analysis regressed externalizing behaviors on the cognitive distortion
variable assuming the worst and the cognitive autonomy variable decision-making.
Model 1 indicated that the control variables were not associated with externalizing
behaviors (see Table 9). The results from Model 2 accounted for 36% of the total
variance in youth’s externalizing behaviors. Concordant with expectations, assuming the
worst was positively related to externalizing behaviors. Disparate with proposed
hypotheses and other results for this population, decision-making was not associated (as
opposed to negatively) with externalizing behaviors (see Table 9). Finally, Model 3
revealed the decision-making did not significantly moderate the relationship between
assuming the worst and externalizing behaviors (see Table 9).
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Table 9
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression of Assuming the Worst and DecisionMaking Predicting Externalizing Behaviors (N = 146)
Model 1
Model 2
Variable
b
SE B
β
b
SE B
β
b
Age at Entry
-0.04 0.50 -0.01 -0.55
0.42
-0.09
-0.54
Adopted
-0.65 1.70 -0.03 -0.82
1.39
-0.04
-0.84
Ethnicity
-1.00 1.99 -0.04 -1.07
1.61
-0.05
-0.97
Gender
-2.03 1.60 -0.11 -2.52
1.33
-0.13
-2.50
Decision
-0.17
0.16
-0.08
-0.16
Assuming
-6.95
0.87
-0.58** -6.96
Assuming x
-0.05
Decision
2
R
0.01
0.36
F for change in R2
0.49
37.62**
Note. Assuming the worst and decision-making were centered at their means
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Model 3
SE B
β
0.43 -0.09
1.40 -0.04
1.66 -0.04
1.34 -0.13
0.16 -0.08
0.88 -0.58**
0.17

-0.02

0.36
0.07

DISCUSSION
Cognitive distortions affect how individuals’ perceive and assess social situations
as well as provide a mechanism to neutralize guilt while engaging in socially
unacceptable behaviors (Bandura, 1991; Barriga & Gibbs, 1996). Studies have shown
that levels of cognitive distortions are higher and are more prevalent in clinical
populations than in nonclinical populations (Brazão et al., 2015; Lardén et al., 2006;
Wallinius et al., 2011). Additionally, previous studies have consistently revealed positive
relationships between cognitive distortions and externalizing behaviors in children and
adolescents (Barriga et al., 2008, 2000; Côté et al., 2006). The effects of cognitive
distortions may be mitigated prior to adolescence, as children rely more on parents and
peers to help when faced with decisions. However, as adolescents mature they become
more cognitively autonomous (Beckert, 2005); that is, they rely less on others to make
decisions. In a typically developing population, this is a natural and healthy transition.
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For adolescents with cognitive distortions, however, increased autonomy may distance
adolescents from individuals that previously may have dampened the effects of cognitive
distortions. This separation from “positive influences” could allow adolescents to
neutralize guilt by way of their cognitive distortions when engaging in externalizing
behaviors. In short, in a clinical population, the increases in cognitive autonomy may
result in cognitive distortions having a greater influence on externalizing behaviors. Prior
to this study, no research has examined the interplay of cognitive distortions and
cognitive autonomy in conjunction with externalizing behaviors.
Cognitive Distortions
The first aim of this study was to determine if cognitive distortions were
positively associated with externalizing behaviors. Results demonstrated that all
dimensions of cognitive distortion (i.e., self-centered thoughts, blaming others,
minimizing/mislabeling blame, assuming the worst ) were positively linked with
externalizing behaviors net of control variables, reaffirming conclusions from previously
studies (Barriga et al., 2008, 2000). Bandura (2001) posited that the moral acceptability
of an action is determined through personal assessment of personal standards, selfsanctions, and personal circumstances. Consistent with this notion, findings from this
study suggest that, in a clinical population, adolescents’ externalizing behaviors are
strongly related to how events are perceived and interpreted (Bandura, 1991). From a
social cognitive perspective, these findings might imply that adolescents in a clinical
population employ in mechanisms of moral disengagement (i.e., cognitive distortions)
more frequently than adolescents in a normal population, resulting in externalizing
behaviors being engaged in more frequently and/or to a more severe degree (Bandura,
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2001). Social cognitive theory would suggest that individuals engaging in self-centered
thoughts, specifically, would place little to no value on others’ needs, wants, and ideas
(Barriga et al., 2000). Since little value is attributed to others’ needs, little remorse is felt
when those needs are not met due to one’s actions (Bandura, 1991, 2001). The positive
associations between self-centered thoughts and externalizing behaviors add further
support to this theory. Similarly, the association between blaming others and
externalizing behaviors supports a social cognitive explanation that, by misattributing
blame of harmful actions to external sources (Barriga et al., 2000), individuals insulate
themselves from blame and remorse, thus preserving self-image (Bandura, 1991, 2001).
Social cognitive theory would posit that minimizing/mislabeling allows individuals to
preserve self-image through the devaluation of others and/or depicting unacceptable
behavior as acceptable or commendable (Bandura, 1991, 2001; Barriga et al., 2000).
This stance is supported by the positive association between minimizing/mislabeling
blame and externalizing behaviors. A mind-set of assuming the worst, wherein
individuals expect the worst-case scenario in social settings, protects self-image by
attributing blame to others and not one’s own behavior (Bandura, 1991; Barriga et al.,
2000). In this study, the construct of assuming the worst had a positive relationship with
externalizing behaviors. These findings add more support to the social cognitive position
that, when in this mind-set, changing or improving behavior is thought to have the same
outcome (Barriga et al., 2000), thus further removing the individual from responsibility
for the consequences of his/her actions (Bandura, 1991).
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Interplay of Cognitive Autonomy and Cognitive Distortions
The main purpose of this study was to determine if cognitive autonomy
moderated the relationship between cognitive distortions and externalizing behaviors. As
this study dealt with a clinical population, it was expected that cognitive distortions
would be more prevalent than in a normal population. With this expectation in mind, it
was posited that cognitive distortions might contaminate the evaluative thinking and
decision-making processes of cognitive autonomy. Following this line of thinking, it was
hypothesized that cognitive autonomy would be positively associated with externalizing
behaviors and further moderate the relationship between cognitive distortions and
externalizing behaviors. The expected result was that cognitive autonomy would
exacerbate the relationship between cognitive distortions and externalizing behaviors.
However, testing revealed that the cognitive autonomy dimensions of evaluative thinking
and decision-making were both negatively linked to externalizing behaviors in this
clinical population, negating the premise on which the moderation hypothesis was
grounded.
One potential reason for the negative relationship found between cognitive
autonomy and externalizing behaviors is that cognitive autonomy theoretically operates
similarly as it would in a nonclinical population. I say theoretical, because no studies
have yet examined the connection between externalizing behaviors and cognitive
autonomy in a nonclinical population. Another possible explanation for these findings is
that cognitive autonomy is not fully developed until late adolescence (Chein, Albert,
O’Brien, Uckert, & Steinberg, 2011; Steinberg, 2008, 2010). Conceivably, cognitive
autonomy and cognitive distortions may function separately until later in adolescence or
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adulthood when both constructs are more developed and a more consolidated self-image
emerges. Another explanation is that cognitive autonomy may not be developed enough
in the younger ages of this sample to counteract the effects of cognitive distortions on
deliberative cognitive processes. Research has shown that the prefrontal-cortex does not
fully develop until the early or mid-twenties (Arain et al., 2013; Johnson, Blum, & Giedd,
2009). As such, future research may benefit from exploring the associations between
cognitive distortions, cognitive autonomy, and externalizing behaviors in older
populations or examine whether age further moderates their relationships.
Alternatively, cognitive autonomy in early- and mid-adolescence may not provide
as much distance from the ideas and/or opinions of parents and peers, as previously
theorized. Previous studies have shown that parental attachment (Bahr, Hoffmann, &
Yang, 2005; Choon, Hasbullah, Ahmad, & Ling, 2013; Harris-McKoy & Cui, 2013), and
parents and peers (Chassin, Presson, Sherman, Montello, & McGrew, 1986; SimonsMorton, Haynie, Crump, Eitel, & Saylor, 2001; Tsakpinoglou, 2017) influence adolescent
participation in externalizing behaviors. For example, parents help shape adolescents’
decision-making process (Chassin et al., 1986; Tsakpinoglou, 2017) and also exert a
certain amount of control over adolescent behavioral autonomy (Pavlova, Haase, &
Silbereisen, 2011; Smetana, Campione-Barr, & Daddis, 2004). Youth in this sample
were still under parental supervision. Several studies have found a negative correlation
between parental involvement and externalizing behaviors (Brotman et al., 2011;
Grolnick & Slowiaczek, 1994; Hill et al., 2004; Hill & Tyson, 2009). As this sample
comes from higher SES families, higher parental involvement is possible. Family rules,
parental oversight, and limiting of behavioral autonomy (due to underage status) may be
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restricting the amount and/or severity of externalizing behaviors, thus minimizing the
moderating effects of cognitive autonomy on the correlations between cognitive
distortions and externalizing behaviors. Future research should include measures of
parental involvement, attachment, and supervision to assess such possibilities.
It was theorized that cognitive distortions may corrupt autonomous cognitive
processes, resulting in stronger positive associations with externalizing behaviors.
However, analyses revealed was that neither evaluative thinking nor decision-making
moderated any of the possible relationships between the four cognitive distortions
dimensions and externalizing behaviors. As previously discussed, youth from clinical
and nonclinical populations exhibit similar levels of cognitive autonomy (Reiser, 2007),
and studies that have connected higher levels of cognitive distortions with elevated levels
of externalizing behaviors (Barriga et al., 2008; van der Velden et al., 2010; van Leeuwen
et al., 2014). Perhaps, when dealing with externalizing behaviors, cognitive distortions
may overshadow the effects of cognitive autonomy. This premise is supported by the fact
that all dimensions of cognitive distortions were more highly associated with
externalizing behaviors than either dimension of cognitive autonomy.
Limitations and Future Directions
As with all studies, there were limitations with this study. One such limitation is
that the population used in the study originated from a private residential treatment
facility that was relatively expensive, suggesting that participants were likely from higher
SES settings. As such, parental involvement may be higher in this sample than lower
SES situations (Grolnick & Slowiaczek, 1994; Hill & Tyson, 2009). Accordingly,
findings for this study may not be generalizable to youth from lower SES situations.

52
Given that previous studies have shown ethnic differences in externalizing behaviors
(Deater-Deckard & Dodge, 1997; Deater-Deckard, Wang, Chen, & Bell, 2012; Lansford,
Deater-Deckard, Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 2004; Miner & Clarke-Stewart, 2008), the lack
of ethnic diversity in this sample reduces generalizability to ethnic minorities. Future
studies would benefit from including representative samples as well as both community
and clinical samples allowing for explicit tests as to whether the associations between
cognitive distortions, cognitive autonomy, and externalizing behaviors are indeed
different in these different populations.
An additional limitation may be the age range sampled. As stated previously,
many researchers assert that cognitive autonomy is not fully developed until late
adolescence (Chein et al., 2011; Steinberg, 2008, 2010). Cognitive autonomy should be
less developed in 10- to 14-year-olds than youth that are 16 to 17 years old. In our
society adolescents are considered adults at the age of 18; yet, as stated earlier,
researchers maintain that the adolescent brain is not fully matured until the early to midtwenties (Arain et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2009). With this in mind, inclusion and
analysis participants in early twenties could result in different relational outcomes.
In addition to sample limitations, there also were potential limitations associated
with the measures of cognitive autonomy. The scales of evaluative thinking and
decision-making were chosen as the focus of this study on conceptual grounds; however,
comparative validation could have provided further insight into parent and peer influence.
For example, this measure included the questions “I need family members to approve my
decision” and “I need my views to match those of my friends.” Additionally, the
dimensions of evaluative thinking and decision-making also were moderately correlated,
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which could explain why similar results were found for both dimensions. Comparative
validation was weakly negatively correlated with evaluative thinking and decisionmaking, which may have produced different outcomes. Future studies should include the
dimension of comparative validation in analyses.
The measure indexing cognitive distortions also had limitations. All subdimensions of cognitive distortions were highly correlated. Appropriately, results from
the regression analyses for the various cognitive distortion variables all had similar
results, suggesting that these indices may have not reflected completely independent
constructs. Future work would benefit from examining the contribution of all four
distortion variables simultaneously in order to determine which dimensions are most
strongly related to externalizing behaviors. Another limitation was that all measures
were obtained from a single self-reporter. Self-report measures rely on honesty in
reporting, but when revealing negative behaviors, participants may not report honestly to
preserve self-image. This concern may be even greater in a population that likely
engages in mechanisms of moral disengagement on a more frequent basis than normal
populations. Individuals in this population may engage these mechanisms unknowingly
during reporting, resulting in self-report bias that celebrates strengths and downplays
externalizing behaviors. Self-report measures also rely on participants’ ability to
introspect, which may be more difficult for adolescents (Austin, Deary, Gibson,
McGregor, & Dent, 1998; Fan et al., 2006). Finally, the data used in this study were
cross-sectional. Tracking changes, after discharge from the facility, in cognitive
autonomy and cognitive distortions may provide insight into this relationship, and how
changes relate to changes in externalizing behaviors.
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Despite these limitations, cognitive distortions were found to be more strongly
related to externalizing behaviors than cognitive autonomy. Appropriately, practitioners’
focus on correcting and/or decreasing cognitive distortions are likely to result in greater
changes in externalizing behaviors, than focus on evaluative thinking or decision-making.
Previous studies have not examined these constructs concurrently or have only examined
clinical or nonclinical populations separately. Such studies would provide greater
understanding to contributions to externalizing behaviors as well as provide practitioners
insight into areas that result in improved treatment outcomes.
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APPENDIX
Research
I understand that wjts romfg ahcaiked is conducting an ongoing program evaluation to document
student outcomes for continuous program improvement. In addition, West Ridge Academy is also
interested in using this same data for possible future research purposes and may collaborate or
consult with other researchers for this purpose. All data used will be anonymous to protect privacy; no
personal, identifying information will be collected. This research has the potential to further our
knowledge of adolescent development and effective strategies for intervention
Your permission to access this data is being requested below so that if the opportunity arises, research
consultants will be able to access to the de-identified information needed to conduct future studies.

Parents: Please initial one below
_______Yes, I agree to have my students’ anonymous data included in research
_______ No, I do not give permission for my students’ anonymous data to be included in research
________________________________________________________________
Parent / Guardian Signature
DATE
Youth Assent: (for those between the age of 7-17 years)
Please initial one below:
_______Yes, I agree to have my anonymous data included in future research.
_______No, I do not give permission for my anonymous data to be included in future research.
___________________________________________________________________
Student Signature
DATE

